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Abstract

*
The paper argues that Emerging Market economies (EMs) face financial vulnerabilities that weaken the effectiveness of a domestic Lender of Last Resort (LOLR). As a result, monetary policy is inextricably linked to the state of the credit market. In particular, the central bank should be ready to operate as LOLR during Sudden Stop (of capital inflows) by releasing international reserves in an effective manner. These conditions also impact on optimal monetary policy in normal but high-volatility periods. The paper further argues that during those periods interest rate rules may engender excessive volatility of exchange rates and, thus, that it may be advisable to temporarily supplement those rules by foreign exchange market intervention or outright exchange rate pegging. At a fundamental level, the analysis suggests that the state-of-the-art literature summarized by Woodford (2003) or even more heterodox approaches exemplified by Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) are likely fall short of providing a satisfactory guide for monetary policy in EMs.
Introduction
"A nice art collection and quiet surroundings do not a First World central bank make" should be the motto of every central banker in Emerging Market economies (EMs). This is especially true during tranquil times in which both the level and volatility of interest rate spreads are low, and the central bank easily forgets its role as Lender of Last Resort (LOLR)-thus entirely focusing on its role as guarantor of price stability in a full-employment setting. Unfortunately, as the high-volatility episode in May/June 2006 reminded us, 1 tranquil times may quickly turn into periods in which an EM central banker looks more like a high-wire performer without a safety net than a sedate analyst whose primary objective is to find the best specification for a Taylor
Rule.
Fortunately, experienced central bankers are well aware of these facts and have acted accordingly. Since 1998, for example, Latin America has increased its stock of international reserves twofold, while Asia (including China) has done so by a factor of three. This followed the Asia 1997 and Russia 1998 crises, which left no doubt that a Sudden Stop (of capital inflows) and attendant liquidity crunch can hit both saints and sinners. However, this type of policy reaction is still less than fully incorporated into central banks' tool kit-which remains replete with sophisticated analyses on how to implement Inflation Targeting, for example, with little or no reference to financial imperfections in EMs.
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The objective of this note is to help to redress the balance by bringing to the fore two distinguishing characteristics of EMs, namely, Sudden Stop and Liability Dollarization (foreignexchange denominated debts).
3 Special emphasis will be placed on Domestic Liability Dollarization (DLD), i.e., domestic residents' dollar debts vis-à-vis the domestic banking system.
These financial features seriously weaken the central bank's role as LOLR, but they have been 1 The expectation that the Fed would further tighten monetary policy caused a major fall in EM stock market prices and rise in credit spreads. Interestingly, the episode carried no noticeable cost in terms of output and employment. 2 Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2001) , and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005) are exceptions in which the incidence of Liability Dollarization and Sudden Stop are explicitly taken into account. The recent book by Mishkin (2006) offers a balanced and cogent exposition of the central issues that motivate the present note. 3 In what follows, "dollar" will be identified with "foreign exchange. " In Eichengreen et al. (2005) Liability Dollarization is instead called Original Sin. The expression "Original Sin" invokes the thought that EMs may not be able to clean the slate, which is still a highly debated issue. To be fair, Liability Dollarization is not free from semantic imprecision either (e.g., is the US Liability Dollarized?), but I will stick with it for the present, albeit with some uneasiness. largely ignored in the literature which, true to form, has focused on issues relevant to mature economies.
4 Section 2 will start by defining LOLR, arguing that EMs are likely to have a somewhat ineffective LOLR. The discussion will then turn to the use of international reserves during Sudden Stop. It will be argued that proper management of Sudden Stop episodes should be high on the central bank's agenda, because they may deteriorate long-term growth prospects, despite the fact that those episodes are not everyday events. Section 3 will discuss some aspects of monetary policy under normal conditions, but under the assumption of a largely ineffective LOLR. Section 4 concludes.
Lender of Last Resort in EMs
Lender of Last Resort (LOLR).
A LOLR is an institution that is able to lend at reasonably low rates of interest to sectors (public or private) that are seriously credit constrained. Typically, this role is carried out by the central bank (and this will be assumed in what follows).
An effective LOLR either has resources of its own (e.g., international reserves) or is able to borrow in the open market at reasonable interest rates. The U.S. Fed is an example of the latter type. Under these circumstances, the LOLR does not interfere with its role as guarantor of price stability. To a large extent, the two types of activities are independent of one another. This has not been the case in most EMs.
Consider, for example, a Sudden Stop episode. The economy as a whole-including the central bank and the other branches of government-undergoes a sudden, highly unexpected, curtailment of international credit (see Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía, 2004 , for an empirical definition). Thus, beyond international reserves, central bank loans have to be financed by seigniorage, i.e., printing money, interfering with the central bank's role as guarantor of price stability.
The LOLR in EMs may also be ineffective in less extreme cases. Suppose, for example, that there is a run on domestic banks in response to rumors of a financial crisis (i.e., a potentially self-fulfilling banking crisis). This is an episode akin to the bank run during the U.S. Great
Depression (see Friedman and Schwartz, 1963 ). An effective LOLR would quickly gain control of the situation by extending necessary loans to banks in order for the run not to cause costly withdrawals of credit lines to the private sector. This operation need not have any impact on prices or the exchange rate because the central bank would simply be accommodating a higher demand for liquidity. 5 The situation would be different, however, if some of the liquidity held by the private sector consisted of foreign exchange, for example, a phenomenon called Currency Substitution in the literature, which is highly prevalent in developing countries (see Calvo and Végh, 1999) . In that case, increasing domestic liquidity may not be neutral, as in the previous instance. Unless this operation is swiftly accompanied by foreign exchange intervention, the increase in domestic liquidity could give rise to a sharp increase in exchange rates and prices.
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Let us now consider the situation one period before the LOLR is called into action and assume that the private sector is fully aware of this. Under an effective LOLR, the expectation that the LOLR will go into action will come as a relief, since it ensures that a major financial accident will be avoided. However, if the LOLR is ineffective, the situation is radically different. The private sector would realize that very soon the money-printing press will likely go into overdrive, pushing prices and exchange rates sharply upwards. Moreover, if the situation is triggered by Sudden Stop, or domestic prices are sticky, the real exchange rate will also increase which, combined with DLD, compromises the health of the banking system, potentially paralyzing the payments system. Thus, just a basic understanding of this scenario will drive the private sector to take precautionary action by means such as withdrawing bank deposits. Most likely, this will be reflected in higher and more volatile interest-rate spreads, having a negative impact on the credit market and possibly triggering some early LOLR activity.
2. Sudden Stop: The role of international reserves. A Sudden Stop is, first and foremost, a credit event. Typically, the country as a whole finds itself bereft of dollar credit, and it makes perfect sense that the international reserves of the central bank are made available to the public. Table 1 shows that this has been the general practice during Sudden Stop episodes since 1980 (see Data Appendix). Central banks lost large quantities of international reserves, and neither reserve 5 Notice that in this instance the central bank can lend without borrowing because the episode corresponds to a situation in which there is a sudden higher demand for central bank liquidity. Perhaps a better characterization of the central bank in this instance would be as Liquidity Provider instead of LOLR. 6 To prevent that a change in liquidity composition will bring about a bank run, some central banks have allowed foreign-exchange deposits. Thus, individuals could change liquidity composition from "peso" to "dollar" without withdrawing their bank deposits. A major drawback of allowing dollar deposits is that they may be a major factor behind the creation of DLD. Thus, as a first approximation, during tranquil times IRT is a system that encompasses most of the systems discussed in the literature, going from fixed to floating exchange rates. Moreover, if IRT is used to implement Inflation Targeting, then the line between the resulting system and pegged exchange rate becomes really blurry. To illustrate, consider the polar case in which the basket of goods whose price index is targeted by IT consists exclusively of foreign exchange (or only pure tradable goods); then IT is equivalent to exchange rate tablitas (i.e., preannounced exchange rates) made famous (or infamous) by exchange-rate-based stabilization plans in the Southern Cone during the 1970s and 1980s (see Calvo and Végh, 1999) .
Normal Conditions but Imperfect LOLR
There is, however, a subtle difference between exchange rate pegs and IRT, namely, the type of bond being employed. In IRT domestic bonds are typically employed, e.g., central bank debt instruments, denominated in domestic or foreign currency. In contrast, for exchange rate pegs the central bank buys or sells foreign exchange, i.e., it employs foreign bonds. 
where ε t+1 is the expected rate of devaluation between periods t and t+1, i t is the policy interest rate from period t to t+1, and κ t is a risk premium in period t (for simplicity, the international interest rate is set equal to zero). Notice that, conditional on κ t , ε t+1 would also be the expected rate of inflation of purely tradable goods (assuming, for simplicity, that dollar inflation is zero).
Thus, if i is set prior to knowing κ, the variance of expected inflation of tradable goods would equal that of κ. If, for example, one proxies κ by the EMBI (as computed by J.P. Morgan), Figure 1 shows that κ's monthly standard deviation has suffered major swings since 1991, reaching a staggering 300 basis points around the 1998 Russian crisis. because empirical studies suggest that exchange rate volatility is detrimental to trade. Since trade and growth appear to go hand in hand (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2000) , one is led to the conclusion that if the policy instrument (in this case the policy interest rate) cannot prevent high volatility, the central bank would be well advised to find another instrument that is more effective in that respect, albeit on a temporary basis. FXI/exchange-rate-pegging is a natural candidate. Pegging the exchange rate in a credible manner would significantly lower the volatility of ε t+1 , shifting its volatility to Jan-91 Jan-92 Jan-93 Jan-94 Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06
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A central bank that follows IT may thus have strong incentives to peg the exchange rate during market turbulence, if tradable goods' prices are a major item in their price index and/or there is a large pass-through coefficient. Moreover, unless the pass-through coefficient is very close to unity, pegging will become even more attractive in the presence of DLD, because high exchange rate volatility is more likely to trigger serious financial turmoil, possibly driving the economy into a "bad" equilibrium.
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Furthermore, it should be recalled that IRT is, by nature, a poor nominal anchor. To show this in a simple manner, consider the case in which the central bank accommodates money supply in order to satisfy an exogenous interest rate target (for a thorough discussion of IRT rules, see Woodford, 2003) . First, let us assume that prices are perfectly flexible and the demand for money is given by function L(i), where, again, i is the policy interest rate. At equilibrium,
).
where M and P are, respectively, money supply and the price level. Thus, given i, any ratio M/P which satisfies equation (2) would be consistent with equilibrium. Uniqueness is recovered in some sticky-price models, but non-uniqueness is still an implication in many models with rational expectations under interest-rate targeting (see, e.g., Calvo, 1983) .
The above remarks do not directly apply to IRT, but they suggest that if the reference interest rate is not sufficiently responsive to other macro variables, equilibrium multiplicity could result, making IRT ineffective. The conjecture is right. Consider an IRT rule in which i = φ(π,c),
where function φ is the central bank's policy function, and π and c stand for inflation and output, respectively. Embedding this central bank reaction function in the closed-economy model in Calvo (1983) , for example, it is easy to show (proof in the Technical Appendix) that if φ π < 1, nonuniqueness holds. Moreover, to ensure (local) uniqueness, we must have φ π > 1 and φ c > 0, which is in line with Taylor's rule, for example.
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Is this enough reason for comfort? I don't think so. In the first place, notice that nominal anchoring is achieved as a result of price stickiness, not nominal money supply or pegging of the exchange rate. Although evidence from the North suggests that price-setting mechanisms are stable, we lack systematic studies showing that the same degree of stability is displayed in EMs, especially during market turbulence.
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The policy interest rate, which is controlled by the central bank, is just one of a number of interest rates existing in the market. If, as is typically the case, the policy interest rate corresponds to short-term interest rates on central bank paper or its interbank equivalent, IRT will certainly affect the cost of that kind of liquidity, but it may have very little impact on overall 18 In Calvo (1983) , π stands for expected inflation (i.e., the right-hand derivative of log price level). Hence, the rule is made contingent on expected inflation. However, as argued in Benhabib et al. (2003) , nonuniqueness problems do not go away if i is set to react to lagged inflation. 19 Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005) show compelling evidence that price stickiness cannot be ruled out even in the context of large exchange rate devaluations. However, they stop short of arguing that the price-setting mechanism remains invariant during those episodes.
liquidity. Actually, I suspect that the disconnect we have recently seen between short and long rates of interest in the US and other advanced economies (called "a conundrum" by former Fed
Chairman Greenspan) may reflect financial innovations that we still do not fully understand (e.g.,
Credit Default Swaps). Moreover, such a disconnect is likely to be more common in EMs, given that they are undergoing a deep process of financial development (as the expression "Emerging
Markets" is intended to suggest). To illustrate these possible complications, consider the case in which the policy interest rate, denoted by i cb , is the interest rate on money. Thus, the demand for money (2) would become:
Under these circumstances, setting i cb puts at best a lower bound on i but otherwise leaves i completely unhinged, implying equilibrium indeterminacy. It can easily be verified that indeterminacy would also hold if i cb applied to any other financial asset yielding "liquidity"
services.
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Therefore, the good news is that there are some reaction functions that ensure uniqueness under stable price-setting mechanisms. But, on the other hand, the bad news is that IRT may possess "birth defects" yet to be discovered. 21 In contrast, Calvo and Végh (1993) , for example,
show in an open-economy version of the same sticky prices model where, in general, equilibrium is unique under pegged exchange rates, giving additional grounds for the belief that pegging (with enough international reserves, of course) could offer a more robust nominal anchor than interest rate tweaking.
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There is an important parallel between pegging and tweaking. In both cases money supply is endogenously determined. This is an attractive feature given that the rapid pace of financial innovation has made it hard to assess the impact that individual monetary aggregates (M1, M2, etc.) have on prices and wages. Advocates of flexible exchange rates, though, criticize pegging by arguing that, at best, it controls a small set of prices (i.e., prices of purely tradable 20 E.g., assets that directly or indirectly enter as arguments in utility functions. See Calvo and Végh (1995) for a discussion. 21 In the literature there are examples in which uniqueness is ensured even under interest rate targeting. For instance, Woodford (2001) shows that uniqueness can be recovered if the primary fiscal surplus is exogenous. However, fiscal discipline becomes highly questionable in periods of financial distress. 22 As shown in Calvo and Végh (1993) imperfect credibility could impair the effectiveness of exchange-rate-based inflation stabilization plans. But the same applies to IRT, as can easily be shown in terms of Calvo (1983) or the model discussed in the Technical Appendix.
goods and services), leaving plenty of room for real exchange rate misalignment (especially for large and relatively closed economies like Brazil, for example). This is a valid concern, especially under conditions of imperfect credibility (see Calvo and Végh, 1993) . However, as shown in previous example, tweaking is also subject to similar concerns.
Taylor (2000), for example, recognizes these difficulties but appears to be more optimistic than my remarks convey. Maybe, after all, simple IRT rules work for unruly EMs.
There is, however, an aspect of the whole issue that we may have ignored, namely, financial market volatility. Again, measuring it by EMBI's volatility (see Figure 1) , it is clear that it has shown a marked declining trend since its 1998 heights. Thus, the recent apparent success of IRT rules in EMs could partly be a consequence of a more stable financial environment.
Two clarifications are in order. First, the above remarks should not be taken to imply that the central bank must freeze the exchange rate at the first sign of high volatility. The implication is only that if high volatility is not just a passing nuisance, the central bank may be justified in setting bounds to the exchange rate. 23 Thus, my remarks are consistent with a situation in which, for example, in the face of high volatility the currency is allowed to devalue sharply but the central bank eventually resorts to FXI to lower exchange rate volatility. Second, it should be noted that exchange rate pegging is not without problems either. If the public is not prepared for the transitory policy change, the latter may contribute to even higher volatility and, possibly, to the emergence of Sudden Stop. This underlies the importance of fully alerting the public that they should expect a transitory instrument switch as the economy transits into choppy waters.
International Reserves and Multiple Equilibria. The above discussion suggests that FX
Intervention could offer an effective remedy against excessive exchange rate volatility in the short run-which, by the way, provides a rationale for the fear of floating highlighted in Calvo and Reinhart (2002) . A strong believer in "fundamentals," however, is likely to object, arguing that if IRT is ineffective, then FXI is bound to fail. Although the argument cannot easily be dismissed when equilibrium is unique, it faces serious challenges when the economy displays multiple equilibria-a situation that receives some support in the literature (see, e.g., Calvo, 1998 and and Obstfeld, 1996) . Under equilibrium multiplicity, policy can help coordinate "good" or "bad" equilibria. International reserves could play a key role in this coordination game, since, as pointed out above, they could help to cushion destructive financial spillovers of Sudden Stop. But, of course, for that to be the case, (a) the stock of reserves has to be large enough, (b) reserves have to be wisely spent during crisis (as discussed in Section 2), and (c) the public has to trust that the government is prepared to use this kind of ammunition (including the use of external credit lines) to the full extent possible.
As noted at the outset, several EMs have substantially increased their international reserves since 1998. Some critics suggest that the stock is already too large by showing that these funds could get a much higher rate of return if invested in alternative financial assets.
However, this is highly debatable. The optimal stock of international reserves is a function of their potential use. For example, if reserves are intended to fill the financing gap in case there are problems in rolling over external short-term debt (the so-called Greenspan-Guidotti criterion), then the levels prevailing in 2006 for Latin America, for example, could easily be claimed to be excessive, since the ratio of reserves to such debt hovers around 2.7 (about 30 percent more than in 1994, prior to the "Tequila" crisis). However, if reserves are intended to reinforce the LOLR, then aggregates like export credit and/or M2 could be a more appropriate denominator than external short-term debt-and the picture that emerges could be significantly different. For example, in Latin America international reserves in 2006 are around 37 percent of M2, which is only about 10 percent higher than in 1994 (see Calvo, 1996b , for a discussion of these issues).
The above discussion employed the phrase "international reserves" without providing a rigorous definition. It is now time to try to be somewhat more precise (a more thorough discussion will be left for another occasion an important question that cannot be fully addressed in this paper. Instead, I will focus on the particular case highlighted by the heading of this section, namely, multiple equilibria. Suppose that international reserves are held in order to stave off "bad" equilibria. This would tend to privilege "gross" over "net," because gross reserves can be utilized to bail out exporters, for In conclusion, the stock of (the relevant concept of) international reserves (or credible international credit lines) should be large enough to prevent a major credit crisis that paralyzes exports and threatens to cripple the domestic banking system, and the public should be well informed about bailout mechanisms. The costs of this strategy may be significant, but they have to be weighed against the benefit of avoiding deep financial crises, which as Cerra and Chaman Saxena (2005) and the previous discussion suggest, could also be large. Of course, this is unlikely to be the socially optimum for the world as a whole. The counterpart of self-insurance is seigniorage accruing to developed economies (to the extent that the interest rates on developed economies' treasury bills, for example, fall short of the opportunity cost of international reserves). Thus, developed economies would be making monopoly profits that are distorting and unfair (especially if one looks at the issue from a Rawlsian perspective). Nonetheless, it should be noted that fairer and more efficient insurance schemes exist. One such scheme would be some kind of Contingent Credit Line (CCL), but perhaps a version that is more agile and free of the stigma that kept the original CCL proposal from being implemented when it was first offered by the IMF. 
Conclusions
Many EMs are at a serious disadvantage relative to developed economies in that they lack an effective Lender of Last Resort, a disadvantage that becomes more acute under Domestic 27 Ugo Panizza (personal communication) proposes to rebate to the world's poorest countries' seigniorage collected on account of their international reserve holdings. A similar proposal was unsuccessfully bandied about in Washington when Argentina considered the possibility of adopting the US dollar as local currency. However, the twist of doing this for the world's poorest countries could prove politically appealing in this era of MDGs.
Liability Dollarization. The economy's fragility may not be noticeable in normal and tranquil times, but its fault lines are revealed during turbulent periods, even in the absence of a major crisis. This paper has focused on the use of a reference or policy interest rate as an instrument for monetary policy. Although this is the instrument of choice for developed economies, the paper claims that the instrument is inherently weak, and in the case of EMs it could become uncomfortably weaker during periods of high volatility. Thus, in choppy waters it may be advisable momentarily to switch to more robust instruments such as some kind of exchange rate peg. To ensure that instrument switching is not a source of confusion for the private sector, the central bank should explain the nature of the policy switch, hopefully well in advance of when that switch becomes necessary. However, the paper stops short of discussing what kind of rules are optimal for switching instruments back and fore. I suspect that this issue will depend on country-specific considerations, although global variables, like the EMBI, are likely to be common to most optimal policy rules.
Needless to say, countries that aspire to have an independent monetary policy should aim at creating the conditions for eliminating Domestic Liability Dollarization and other financial vulnerabilities. This is not an easy task if it is going to be carried out on a voluntary basis. In the meantime, EMs will have to grapple with the kind of financial vulnerabilities highlighted in these notes.
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28 Absent from these notes, incidentally, is any reference to banking regulation, and issues such as restrictions on capital mobility, which may attenuate or exacerbate financial vulnerabilities. These are important issues that are better left for a separate note.
Data Appendix
The sample covers all developing countries included in World Development Indicators (WDI 
Technical Appendix
Consider the model in Calvo (1983) . According to equations (39), (40a) and (40b) in that paper: 
where the instantaneous utility function is given by v(m) + u(c); m and c stand, respectively, for real monetary balances and consumption (there is no capital accumulation). Moreover, i, ρ, π and y stand, respectively, for the central bank interest rate, the subjective rate of discount, the rate of inflation, and full-capacity output. Calvo (1983) shows that if i is exogenously given and money supply is endogenous (strict interest rate targeting), then, by (A1), m is determined once c is known. Moreover, by (A2) and (A3), the determination of c and π is independent of m. Thus, one can solve for c and π from equations (A2) and (A3). Notice that the initial values of c and π are not predetermined. Hence, uniqueness requires that system (A2) and (A3) in c and π be unstable around the steady state. However, Calvo (1983) shows that the system displays saddlepath stability, implying that there is a continuum of initial conditions (c 0 , π 0 ) that give rise to a convergent equilibrium path, even though prices are sticky.
Consider now the case mentioned in the text in which i = φ(π,c). If φ π > 1 and φ c > 0, then the sign pattern of the Jacobian, J, associated with the linear expansion of (A2)-(A3) around the steady state, satisfies:
